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Article 
Public participation and rural management of 
Brazilian waters: an alternative to the deficit model 
Alessandro Luís Piolli, Maria Conceição da Costa  
ABSTRACT: The knowledge deficit model with regard to the public has been severely criticized in 
the sociology of the public perception of science. However, when dealing with public decisions 
regarding  scientific  matters,  political  and  scientific  institutions  insist  on  defending  the  deficit 
model. The idea that only certified experts, or those with vast experience, should have the right to 
participate in decisions can bring about problems for the future of democracies. Through a type of 
“topography of ideas,” in which some concepts from the social studies of science are used in 
order to think about these problems, and through the case study of public participation in the 
elaboration of the proposal of discounts in the fees charged for rural water use in Brazil, we will 
try  to  point  out  an  alternative  to  the  deficit  model.  This  alternative  includes  a  “minimum 
comprehension” of the scientific matters involved in the decision on the part of the participants, 
using criteria judged by the public itself.  
1. Introduction 
The  centrality  of  science  and  technology  in  the  present  world  increasingly  generates  a  rise  in  the 
participation of scientists in public decisions, especially in the resolution of controversies. From the point 
of view of the social studies of science, this growing participation highlights two problems for the future 
of democracies. The problem of liberal democracies coexisting and relating to each other, the principle of 
equality, and the phenomenon of expertise derive from social theory. Inequalities in the participation of 
specialists and non-specialists end up overpowering citizens’ rights, thus making public participation a 
farce.  In  this  perspective,  specialized  knowledge  is  seen  as  a  political  threat.  Experts  are  treated  as 
holders of knowledge, conferring upon them a power that is uncontrollable and unobtainable by others. 
This idea comes from the supposition that the public would not have the capacity to understand some 
matters and, thus, would not have control over the possible consequences. The second problem derives 
from normative political theory: the State, supposedly neutral with respect to the different opinions, 
injures the principle of neutrality of liberal democracy by giving special status to the opinion of experts. 
According to Turner,
1 if these two problems are thought of separately, they could be solved through 
political paths. The democratic lack of control of specialized knowledge could be solved by means of 
citizens’ councils in technology or administrative committees with public participation, as occurs in the 
majority  of  democracies  of  developed  countries.  The  solution  to  the  supposed  “public  inability”  to 
participate  in  decisions  would  be  education,  which  would  come  to  show  the  importance  of  public 
understanding of science for political decisions. Thought of together, however, the two problems bring 
about a more complex question: if the experts are the beginning of public knowledge, and this knowledge is 
not superior to the opinion of the lay public, which does not hold an “expert” certificate, the public is, then, 
not only less competent than the experts, but it is more or less under their cultural or intellectual control.
2 
In this way a problem is designed which persists, or which could persist, even in more participatory and 
democratic models of political decision. Inevitably, these spaces, which propose the participation of a non-
specialized public in political decisions that involve technical and scientific matters, would not resolve the 
problems generated by the inequalities of knowledge between experts and lay persons. Thus, how would it 
be possible to think of a model of public participation which manages to escape these problems? 
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We will attempt, through theoretical review and the study of Brazilian rural water management, to think 
of  possible  paths  that  free  us  from  the  model  of  public  knowledge  deficit  and  the  accusation  of 
ideologizing on the part of scientists, who have not indicated solutions to the problems which have been 
brought up. 
2. Deficit model and public participation: a topography of ideas 
For decades now, scientific and political institutions have reproduced the vision that rejection with regard 
to normative scientific suppositions about innovations considered to be “good,” “valuable” and “safe” is 
caused by ignorance and by the public being misled in the interpretation of knowledge. This is the so-
called model of “public deficit” of knowledge, of resistance, or of public mistrust. 
This idea of ignorance or of being misled with regard to science in the refutation of proposals based on 
scientific knowledge can be considered a flexible construction. It is crucial in invoking aspects of the 
“rationalization  of  public  deficit”  that  attempt  to  explain  the  origin  of  failures  of  scientific  policy  in 
obtaining public authority for its commitments made in the name of “science”.
3 The official retreat of the 
public deficit model occurred as a result of the criticism of the social sciences with relation to its lack of 
evidence,  or  in  the  perception  of  problems  that  come  about  when  lay  knowledge  is  ignored  in  the 
elaboration of public policies. In addition to this, as Felt
4 points out, the quality and quantity of knowledge 
that people should have for the decision-making process, according to the public deficit model, is a sensitive 
topic in political terms. In other words, the choice of contents and the depth of knowledge that the lay public 
should have in order to participate in public decisions can escape from democratic control. 
Using his own way to describe reflexivity, which differs from that used in social constructivism in the 
sociology of science, Wynne
5 defines the concept as a process of identification, critical examination, and 
pre-analytical suppositions that construct the commitment of knowledge. For Wynne, in the sociology of 
the public understanding of science, the public is usually seen as incapable of critical reflection with 
regard to epistemological controversies and their relationship with knowledge. Through the review of the 
bibliography and case studies on the public perception of science, he defends that this view of the public 
as irreflexive, which is common in science, exposes the irreflexivity of scientific constructions on how 
the public deals with scientific knowledge. This because, on the other hand, the reflexive capacity of the 
public in relation to scientific knowledge has been systematically underestimated through the defense of 
the model of public knowledge deficit, which has turned out to be “more of an ideological construction 
than a truly scientific model”.
6 In this perspective, the public has proven to be more reflective in its 
appropriation of knowledge in the resolution of practical situations than scientists have in the use of 
science by the public. 
In  public  decisions,  the  authority  of  scientific  experts,  or  cognitive  authority,  can  been  seen  as 
corporative. Scientists possess authority when they speak as representatives of science. Public judgment 
is of science as a corporate phenomenon. In other words, scientists speak in the name of science. The 
political concept of authority, constructed through legitimation, as well as the authority of certain types of 
scientific experts can, in some cases, be analogous. In order to discuss these concepts, Turner
7 cites the 
example of the legitimation of the cognitive authority of physicists, a paradigmatic case of Mertonian 
cognitive authority, in order to affirm that it is a type of authority which passes through a process of 
democratic legitimization by the public, in a similar fashion to other processes of political legitimization. 
With this, he proposes a typology to examine the differences in the processes of legitimation among 
different  types  of  experts,  having  as  a  basis  the  comparison  between  the  physicists’  “ideal”  type  of 
expertise and the experts, or the “cultural expert”, as described by Habermas. In the latter case, contrary 
to that which happens with physicists, the authority of the expert that backs political decisions frequently 
does not go through any type of democratic process of legitimation. 
For Weber,
8 conceptually there are three “ideal types” of domination and, as a result, of legitimacy. The 
first is called “patrimonialist”, exercised by the patriarch or lord of the land, by means of the authority of 
the “eternal past”. In other words, this type is because of customs sanctified by immemorial validity and 
by habit. The second is “charismatic power”. This is legitimated by the strictly personal devotion and 
confidence placed in an individual, because of his prodigious traits, heroism, or other characteristics that 
make him a leader. The third is “rational power”, or bureaucratic rational power, which imposes itself 
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legal statue, or through positive competence, as is observed in the case of the “servant of the State.” In all 
three cases, there is, as a last resort, an ethos which substantiates the legitimacy of domination. 
In Turner’s analysis,
9 this ethos, in cases of traditional and rational authorities, can be interpreted as 
indirect.  Charismatic  authority,  however,  implies  an  ethos,  a  set  of  direct  rules.  Turner  considers 
cognitive authority to be analogous with charismatic authority, given that there is a belief that scientists 
possess a special cognitive power. 
With legitimacy being a basic presupposition for the status of authority, or of expert, Turner
10 develops 
a  list  with  five  types  of  expertise.  These  types  vary  according  to  the  process  of  legitimation  of  the 
specialist’s knowledge. The objective of the typology is not the creation of a taxonomy of experts in and 
of itself, but rather the discussion of the different processes of legitimation and the political implications 
of the different experts from North America and from the majority of industrialized countries. Later on 
we  will  see  that  this  typology  allows  for  an  evaluation  of  the  changes  which  took  place  in  the 
democratization process of water management in Brazil. 
In the typology proposed by Turner, the Type I expert would be that described by Merton (with regard 
to  physicists),  whose  expertise  is  broadly  accepted  by  the  non-specialized  public  outside  of  the 
institutional context. For this reason, this expert has democratic legitimacy constructed in a way similar 
to that which occurs in the construction of political authority.  
Theologians, in spite of having authority as specialists, possess legitimacy only within one sector of 
society. Thus they do not go through the same process of democratic legitimation as physicists. These are 
Type II experts. With the separation of church and state – a characteristic of modern western societies – 
theologians are no longer the exclusive contributors in political decisions. These decisions have come to 
be more closely related with scientific consultants. 
In  contrast  to  the  first  two  types  of  experts,  which  go  through  a  process  of  legitimation  in  pre-
established  audiences, Type  III  experts  create  their  own  followers.  Best-selling  authors  (of  self-help 
books, for example) and massage therapists are examples of this third type. 
The fourth type of expert is composed of actors funded directly or indirectly by the State, through 
foundations and philanthropic institutions, when they speak as experts in order to convince the public and 
impede  a  determined  action  or  political  choice.  Some  leaders  of  North American  NGOs  and  social 
movements are examples of Type IV experts. 
The Type V expert, fruit of the historical development of the fourth type, is the specialist who acts 
directly in conjunction with the public administration. Many times this type is unknown to the broader 
public. The relationship between scientific consultants and public decision-makers and the conflicts of 
interest  are  not  widely  recognized  or  disclosed.  Many  decisions  are  made  with  the  assistance  and 
technical legitimation of experts who are unknown to journalists or the public, thus making any type of 
democratic control impossible. 
Because they have direct or indirect funding from the State and take part actively in the realm of 
political decisions (contrary to self-help authors and religious figures), these two latter types of experts 
(Types IV and V) can, according to Turner, cause more problems for the democratic process, given that 
they do not go through democratic audiences of public legitimization. 
Collins  and  Evans
11  propose  to  advance  the  analysis  of  Type  I  expertise,  given  that  they  consider 
Turner’s Type I expert an unresolved problem in the social studies of science. These authors propose a 
normative theory of expertise and of experience, based on three other categories of expertise: “non-
expertise”,  “interactional  expertise”  and  “contributive  expertise.”  Using  the  idea  of  the  scientific 
community as a core set, Collins and Evans affirm that the expertise conferred by theology and by 
astrology, for example, are discontinuous with the contributive expertise of the core set in the area of 
scientific study involved in a determined discussion, whereas the expertise of non-certified persons can, 
in some cases, be considered continuous. In order to illustrate this, they cite the example studied by Brian 
Wynne of sheep farmer participation in determining measures to be adopted after the Chernobyl accident. 
According  to  the  typology  proposed  by  Collins  and  Evans,  the  sheep  farmers  fit  into  the  model  of 
contributive expertise, given that they could, in this case, contribute in an even more precise way than 
scientists involved in the matter in order to determine the time it would take for the environment to be 
clear of radiation after the nuclear accident. 
In the attempt to delineate the limits of legitimation of contributions in public decisions, Collins and 
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the decision. The second form of judgment is discriminatory ability, which consists of the capability of 
distinguishing the possible contributions of the actor (expert) in the decision of the matter.
12 
Within this classification, interactional expertise is the result of the immersion of an individual in the 
linguistic culture of a determined group of specialists, without the individual necessarily belonging to 
said  group.  This  ability  is  related  to  knowledge  acquired  through  contact  with  scientists,  or  with  a 
determined social group, that can result, for example, in an individual who is able to pass as a specialist 
in an area of knowledge. In reality, this individual is not a specialist, but he or she has had ample contact 
with the language.
13 Interactional expertise is related to the fundamental ability to intermediate public 
participation in scientific matters: translation. If the ability to translate different languages consists of 
more than having multiple interactional expertises, then it is necessary to have the abilities of journalist, 
professor, and writer.
14 
3. Hydrographic basin committees and public participation 
In the region of Campinas, in the state of São Paulo, Brazil, the mobilization of the civil society in the 
defense of hydric resources resulted in the creation of the Intermunicipal Consortium of Hydrographic 
Basins of the Piracicaba, Capivari and Jundiai Rivers (PCJ Consortium) in 1989. Made up of water users 
and  municipal  governments  of  the  region,  the  PCJ  Consortium  demanded  the  improvement  of 
environmental quality and the increase of public participation in decisions, through legal and institutional 
changes in water management. This increase in public participation began to take place in 1991 with the 
creation of the State Committee for Hydrographic Basins of the Piracicaba, Capivari and Jundiai Rivers 
(PCJ Committee), the first in the state of São Paulo. The main responsibilities of the basin committees are 
to establish values to be charged for water use in the region and to elaborate basin plans that point out 
ways in which funds raised should be spent.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. State Map of São Paulo with its main hydrographic basins.
15 
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The hydrographic basin committees call for a tripartite constitution, with representation from users 
(industries, farmers and water-treatment companies, who all use water commercially), public authorities 
(municipal governments, state and federal hydric resource organs and companies) and organized civil 
society (universities, research centers, NGOs and associations). 
Within  the  management  model  proposed  in  Brazil,  the  improvement  in  the  conditions  of  hydric 
resources and the “rational use” of water involve changes in habits. These changes require “educational” 
or “scientific communication” processes for users as well as for members of the committees. Committee 
decisions, almost without exception, involve technical matters which are difficult for non-specialists to 
comprehend. This creates difficulties for the effective participation of society in general, users, and even 
specialists from areas that are not directly related to the decision in question. Within the committees, this 
often  ends  up  brings  about  the  defense  of  views  that  are  similar  to  the  model  of  public  deficit  of 
knowledge, with a logic that places the quantity of technical knowledge as directly proportional to the 
quality of participation. 
However, our case study of the elaboration of discounts in the fee for rural water use shows that, with a 
minimum of information and sufficient knowledge to contribute to the debate, rational discussion is 
possible. 
4. Public participation and expertises in rural water charges 
In an attempt to make the system of charging for water adequate to the reality of rural users, the PCJ 
Committee established a fee discount for agricultural use (initially 90%). Those in opposition to this 
sector considered this to be a lobbying effort on the part of the rural sector. However, with a charge for 
commercial water use, farmers would have a significantly higher increase in production cost than other 
sectors and this would be passed on to the end user. 
In  this  controversy,  the  Rural  Technical  Chamber  (Rural  TC)  –  one  of  the  committee’s  eleven 
consultative organs for technical and scientific matters – passed the initial proposal of parameters for 
discounts in plenary sessions of the PCJ Committees, in 2007. This was done based on negotiations 
among the participants, with the degree of environmental impact specific to farming activities serving as 
a technical basis. The lesser the water impact of the farming activity, the greater the discount in the fee 
for  water  use.  In  spite  of  this  technical  and  scientific  nature  of  the  decisions  of  the  Rural  TC,  the 
committee consists of representatives of the three segments of society. The Rural Discount Coefficient 
(Rural  K)  was  developed  according  to  parameters  established  in  the  process  of  political  negotiation 
among the differing participant actors. Since the definition of rural charges also involved the committee’s 
evaluation of the proposal, it was negotiated with those representing actors who were not a part of the 
Rural TC. These actors also seek backing in the authority conferred by the use of scientific rationalities 
and knowledge, thus demonstrating even more the importance of relations between the communication of 
science and participation in water management. 
Three positions regarding the rural charge are defended in the committees. Represented by the non-rural 
user sector, the environmentalist sector and some scientists, those opposed to the rural discount consider that 
the full charge for agricultural water use would be the only form of ending waste and generating enough 
resources for water management, given that agriculture is the largest consumer. Among farmers, discounted 
fees are defended, thus justifying the investment of more resources in the rural sector, minimizing use 
conflicts, and guaranteeing usage rights. There is also the more radical stance of some farmers who oppose 
any  type  of  rural  charge  for  water  use. The  main  argument  here  is  the  increase  in  the  price  of  food 
production, alleging that in-depth scientific studies about such a fee’s social and economic impacts on 
agricultural activity are necessary before beginning discussions about this possibility. The discourses of 
defense of these three positions seek backing through the reconstruction of scientific knowledge. 
Thinking about the perspective of Collins and Evans,
16 it is possible to visualize a contributive expertise 
of  the  “core  set”  in  the  construction  of  the  proposal.  This  is  represented  by  a  Rural  TC  member’s 
postdoctoral research in the field of water and soil engineering.
17 This research has as its main objective 
the development of the Rural K. The contributive expertise of the farmers was made possible by allowing 
representatives of the agricultural sector to participate in the Rural TC. The interactional expertise, on the 
other hand, which can be seen as a science communications facilitator, was also present in the elaboration 
of the rural discount for the charge of water. Some Rural TC members who are from rural unions, for 
example, have greater fluency with the technical terms of agronomic engineering. They also dialogue A.L. Piolli, M. Conceição da Costa  6 
 
easily with farmers, who are less familiar with formal language in the areas of irrigation and economics. 
In the Rural TC meetings, it was found that there were actors with multiple interactional expertises – with 
broad abilities in technical language regarding engineering as well as in “farmer” language – who proved 
to be fundamental in favoring a minimal understanding for democratic debate. 
The limits of the legitimation of contributions in the decisions about rural charges in the case studied were 
successful, in part, in the two forms of judgment proposed by Collins and Evans. The first – the judgment of 
what types of experience would be relevant for the decision – occurred with the PCJ Committee allowing 
farmers and agronomic engineers with specific experience in the area of water and soil engineering to 
participate in the elaboration of the proposal. This opened up debate between experts from the area’s core 
set and the main contributive experts – in this case, the farmers. The second form of judgment proposed by 
Collins and Evans – the discriminatory ability or the ability to distinguish the possible contributions of the 
actor (expert) to the decision in question – also worked in a way that can be considered satisfactory. The 
dynamic  of  the  decision-making  meetings  and  the  mixed  nature  of  the  Rural  TC  makeup  (with 
representatives from the three segments that constitute the committee) allow an opening for debate and 
participation by different actors and interests in the judgment of possible controversies. 
Through the analytical perspective of Turner’s typology,
18 the possible problems of the lack of democratic 
control caused by Type IV and Type V experts are, in part, minimized by some particularities of the Rural 
TC makeup and of the new forms of decision-making made possible by the management model through 
Hydrographic Basin Committees. The repeated attempts to allow the non-specialized public to at least 
understand the minimum decision-making aspects allowed for a greater opening for debate, as compared to 
the forms of decision that occurred in the management model previous to the Committee. 
After almost two and a half years of work, and as a result of the discussions and research, a discount 
proposal for rural charges was presented to the Rural TC members. In the formal presentation of the Rural K 
to the Rural TC members, the economic impacts of charges were simulated, in absolute terms, with values, 
in Brazilian reais, that would be paid for a determined quantity of water consumed, as well as in relative 
terms, with the value, in terms of percentage, that a charge would represent for the total rural production 
cost. A comparison was also shown with the percentage that the charge represents in other sectors of water 
users. In this way, even if a considerable group of people who are members of the Rural TC did not 
understand the reasons and the scientific arguments that served as a basis for the proposal’s technical 
elaboration, the practical impacts of the water charge for farmers through the use of the Rural K were 
communicated in a way that allowed the minimum understanding necessary for public participation. 
The  existence  of  this  minimum  understanding  necessary  was  evident  when,  upon  finishing  the 
presentation of the proposal in the meeting, two farmers with little experience in participating in the 
Rural TC were questioned as to whether they had understood the proposal. One of them responded, “We 
really don’t understand very well how these calculations were done; it would be helpful if a written text 
were elaborated, so that we could take a calmer look at the proposal”. A more experienced representative 
from the rural union questioned, “But, how much you are going to spend on water, sir, how much your 
water bill would be at the end of the month, according to the proposal, you understood clearly, is that 
correct?” The response was direct and categorical. “Perfectly, we understand this enough to pass this 
proposal,” responded the farmer. 
Using Turner’s  typology  to  establish  a  comparison, Type V  experts  contributed  to  and  legitimized 
decisions exclusively in the old management model. These experts were unknown to the public and they 
acted in a way so as not to allow any type of democratic control. Using our case study – the establishing 
of a rural charge – as a reference, we observed a clear advance in the democratic process, keeping in 
mind that the decisions which are currently made are done so with the participation of Type I experts, 
who go through pre-established audiences of democratic legitimation. Type V experts (who now perhaps 
do not fit into this classification because of circumstances) are called on to contribute because of their 
knowledge of the topic and, in some cases, to carry out the decisions that were made together with 
representatives of different segments of society. 
5. Final considerations 
Using our case study and Wynne’s definition,
19 it is possible to affirm that the reflexivity of scientists 
about the “lay” appropriation of scientific knowledge, as well as the recognition of the value of public, 
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fundamental for the democratic process. In this way, the forms of judgment of the legitimacy of actor 
participation proposed by Collins and Evans, through the use of Turner’s typology, also proved to be 
useful for the creation of more democratic models of decision-making. 
The greater opening for debate which was brought about by the hydrographic basin committees became 
apparent when the experts who contributed to public decisions regarding waters, together with the State, 
began to negotiate with other actors, other experts and new interests in public decisions. New types of 
experts emerged, bringing about greater diversity for the debate of water use and thus strengthening public 
participation in decisions. We attempted to show that institutional changes in this context that have taken 
place in recent years can be an inspiration for a new phase of democracy in Brazil, with greater public 
participation in political decisions, even those which involve complex technical and scientific problems. 
One  of  the  questions  that  remains  would  seem  to  be  that  of  how  to  deal  with  the  inequality  of 
knowledge between the lay public and specialists. The work of the Rural Technical Chamber, in the 
determination of fees charged for water use, points out possibilities for overcoming part of the problem. 
In spite of the fact that the communication of technical matters occurs in an incomplete way in this 
context,  the  attempts  for  minimal  understanding  of  the  necessary  aspects  for  participation  in  the 
controversies on the part of the public contributed in a significant way to broadening the debate. It is 
exactly this minimum amount of knowledge necessary for participation that we defend as an alternative 
to the deficit model. 
However, in order for the necessary minimum not to create the risk of hiding scientific and technical 
aspects which are fundamental to democratic debate, the differing interests which are at stake also need 
to be represented in decisions by specialists. In addition to this, the judgment and the final say on the 
quantity of knowledge necessary and the right moment for decision should be of the non-specialized 
public, as observed in the example of the Rural TC. In this way, the deficit model can be surpassed. The 
hierarchy  between  public  and  specialist  can  be  replaced  by  cooperation.  Knowledge  is  no  longer 
exclusively possessed by rivals of the public – it is also possessed by the public’s allies. 
Translated by Robert Gartner 
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